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Arbitration with Governments:
"Domestic" v. "International" Awards
GEORGES R. DELAUME*
Depending upon the circumstances, arbitration with governments may
take the form of domestic arbitration or of a more or less sophisticated
international process of adjudication governed by its own set of rules.
Submitting disputes to domestic arbitration may have the advantage of
providing the arbitrators with well established procedural rules and of facil-
itating the recognition and enforcement of resulting awards. However,
domestic arbitration is still subject in a number of countries to various
forms of judicial control' and the state party may be reluctant to submit,
however indirectly, to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Furthermore,
unless arbitration is conducted under institutional rules, the rules of proce-
dure found in national legislations may not necessarily satisfy the require-
ments of the parties, either because these rules are not modern enough or
lack flexibility. 2
Having recourse in institutional arbitration may eliminate some of these
problems but at a price which may not be negligible. Certain institutions,
such as the International Chamber of Commerce, calculate their adminis-
trative charges and the arbitrators' fees on the basis of a percentage of the
amount in dispute. In view of the fact that disputes with states often
involve large sums of money, the costs of arbitration can be very
substantial.
For these, and no doubt other, reasons, the parties may wish to remove
the dispute from the reach of domestic law and to "internationalize" the
arbitral process.
* Senior Legal Adviser, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the
IBRD.
'A dramatic example of judicial interference with an award is found in the decision of the
Swiss Federal Tribunal of May 5, 1976 (102 ATF Ia 576 (1976)) in the case of Soci6t6 des
Grands Travaux de Marseille v. Republique Populaire du Bangladesh. This decision is sum-
marized in Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 A.J.I.L. 784 (1981), at
789-90.
2Note that the U.K. Arbitration Act 1979 and the French Decree of May 12, 1981 have been
enacted for the purpose of increasing the attractiveness of London and Paris, respectively as
international arbitration centers, particularly though not exclusively in regard to disputes
involving states. See, e.g., Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitra-
tion: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 98 (1980); Delaume, Interna-
tional Arbitration under French Law, 37 ARB. J. 38 (1982).
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This can be done by way of arbitral compacts providing for ad hoc arbi-
tration or by submission to institutional arbitration governed by the ICSID
Convention.
In this connection, however, it should be noted that, although these two
techniques of internalization share a common objective, their respective
effectiveness cannot be compared.
Ad hoc arbitration clauses vary significantly in detail and precision. In
most cases, provisions concerning the conduct of the proceedings are for-
mulated in general terms and leave to the arbitrators a significant margin of
discretion. Furthermore, it is not at all sure that "internationalized" awards
may benefit from the liberal treatment accorded to "foreign" awards by a
network of treaties, including the New York Convention.
In contrast, the ICSID Convention provides a self-contained machinery
operating in total independance from domestic law, including the law of the
situs of arbitration and that of the recognizing forum. Proceedings under
the convention are carried out under a set of truly international rules. Also,
the convention provides a unique and expeditious procedure for the recog-
nition and enforcement of ICSID awards.
Under the circumstances and subject to further consideration, it can be
stated that the ICSID Convention offers an arbitration system for more
effective than ad hoc international arbitration.
In order to appreciate the respective merits of domestic versus interna-
tional arbitration and of ad hoc international versus ICSID arbitration, this
paper will consider: (1) the options opened to the parties outside the ICSID
machinery and (2) arbitration under ICSID.
I. Non-ICSID Situations
A. To Go Domestic or International
There is no consensus of opinion as to the respective merits of subjecting
the proceedings to domestic law or of "internationalizing" procedural rules.
In the Sapphire award, which involved a dispute between a Canadian
company and the National Iranian Oil Company3 and in the BP award,
between British Petroleum and Libya, 4 the arbitrators held that the award
should be rendered in the context of domestic law, namely the law of the
place of arbitration. As stated in the BP award:
The effectiveness of an arbitral award that lacks nationality-which it may if the
law of the arbitrator is international law--generally is smaller than that of an
award founded on the procedural law of a specific legal system and partaking of
its nationality.5
3Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., March 15, 1963, 35 I.L.R. 136
(1967).
'B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, October 10,
1973, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1979).
Id at 309.
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The opposite view prevailed in the Aramco award,6 which involved
Saudi Arabia, and in the Topco award, 7 which related to a dispute between
two U.S. oil companies and Libya. In both cases, the arbitrators held that
the arbitration was directly governed by international law, on the ground,
inter a/ia, that the jurisdictional immunity of the state party to the dispute
excluded that the proceedings could be subject to the law of another state
and in particular the law at the place of arbitration.
These decisions raise a number of provocative questions. The BP/Sap-
phire doctrine starts from the premises that reliance on the lex loci arbitri
affords guidance to the arbitrators and should, in view of the network of
bilateral treaties and multinational conventions on the subject, facilitate the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Against this view, it can be
said, as was done in Topco, that considerations relating to enforcement are
"not within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator,"8 or perhaps more precisely
should be of greater concern to the parties than to the arbitrator. In other
words, the arbitrator should have no more concern for the ultimate enforce-
ment of his award than a court of law for the recognition and enforcement
abroad of a judgment involving a transnational situation. In both cases, it
is the responsibility of the parties to assess, from the point of view of effec-
tiveness, the respective merits of choosing between arbitral and judicial liti-
gation and to bear the consequences of their choice.
Another objection that can be made to the BP/Sapphire doctrine is that it
assumes too readily that the parties, one of which is a state, are always
willing to submit to the lex loci arbitri and accept the supervision of the
local judicial authority for the sole purpose of securing an "effective"
award. In this connection, it may be appropriate to recall that the English
Arbitration Act 1979, abolishing the special case procedure, was enacted for
the purpose, among others, of assuring foreign states that, by submitting to
arbitration in London, they would no longer have to fear that the submis-
sion implied acceptance of the judicial supervisory authority of the English
courts.
The Aramco-Topco doctrine avoids these objections, but lends itself to
the criticism that it places excessive emphasis on considerations of sover-
eign immunity as a factor of determination. To hold that procedural rules
should be "internationalized" solely because of reasons of jurisdictional
immunity is to ignore the fact that submission to arbitration is in itself a
waiver of that immunity. Unless it is assumed that, in submitting to arbi-
tration, a state does so with mental reservations, there is no reason to
6Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963).
'Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 3 (1978); 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
'Id 12. See also von Mehren and Kourides, International Arbitration between States and
Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 A.J.I.L. 476 (1981) at 537;
Delaume, op. cit. note I supra, at 792.
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believe that the submission should have an impact upon the nature, domes-
tic or international, of procedural rules.
The LIAMCO award, which involved Libya,9 adopts an intermediate
position. Considering that in the absence of express agreement between the
parties it is incumbent upon the arbitrator to determine the applicable pro-
cedural rules and that such a determination should be made "indepen-
dently of the local law of the seat of arbitration"' 0 the arbitrator held
that: (1) the seat of arbitration should be fixcd in Geneva, Switzerland; and
(2) that:
The Arbitrator, in his procedure, shall be guided as much as possible by the gen-
eral principles contained in the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure elabo-
rated by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in 1958.11
This approach, which is consistent with the modem view which de-
emphasizes the significance of the lex loci arbitri, does not necessarily solve
all problems. In particular, it does not answer the argument made by the
supporters of the BP doctrine that "international" awards might not be as
easily enforced as a domestic award. In fact, however, the internationaliza-
tion of the procedure in LIAMCO proved immaterial to the recognition of
the award in a number of countries parties to the New York Convention.
B. Issues of Recognition and Enforcement
Between the rendering of the LIAMCO award and the ultimate settle-
ment of LIAMCO's claim against Libya, LIAMCO succeeded in having
the award recognized in France 12 and in Sweden.' 3 Presumably, although
this does not appear clearly from the reported decisions, recognition was
granted on the ground that, notwithstanding the rules adopted by the arbi-
trator, the award was a "Swiss" award because it was "made" in Geneva
and, therefore, qualified for recognition under the New York Convention.
This characterization of the award also prevailed in the United States,' 4
where much emphasis was placed upon the fact that the award was "ren-
dered" in Switzerland and that, under the reciprocity concept embodied in
the New York Convention, the United States had a treaty commitment to
give effect to the award.15
'Libyan American Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, April 12, 1977, 20
I.L.M. 1 (1981).
"Id at 42 (p. 82 of the award).
"Id at 43 (p. 83 of the award).
'
2 T.G.I. Paris March 5, 1979, Procureur de la R~publique v. Soci6t6 LIAMCO, Clunet 1979,
857.
"1C.A. Svea June 18, 1980, Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Arab Republic of
Libya, 20 I.L.M. 893 (1981), annotated by Paulsson, Clunet 1981, 544.
"Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), referring to Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F.
Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978). See also the U.S. government's brief and memorandum reproduced
in 20 I.L.M. 161 (1981), at 169-70.
"This characterization is also implicit in the judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (T.F.
June 19, 1980, Socialist Libyan Arab Popular Jamahiriya v. Libyan American Oil Co., 20
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In other words, these decisions mean that for the purposes of the conven-
tion the relevant consideration is the location of the seat of arbitration and
that awards rendered in a contracting state are capable of recognition in
other contracting states regardless of the domestic or international character
of the rules governing the proceedings.
From the viewpoint of international arbitration this approach is encour-
aging. Yet a word of caution is necessary because decisions rendered in
other countries appear to lend support to the BP doctrine.
Thus, in N. V Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co. ,16 a Dutch court
experienced no problem in recognizing the binding character of the Sap-
phire award, which was not only rendered in Switzerland but, as mentioned
earlier, was deliberately subjected to the procedural law of the Canton of
Vaud, i.e. to the law prevailing at the situs of arbitration.
However, the decisions rendered by Dutch courts in connection with pro-
ceedings for the recognition in the Netherlands of the award rendered in
the dispute between Socitb Europbenne d'Etudes et d'Entreprises (SEEE)
and Yugoslavia cast a shadow on the status of "delocalized" or "interna-
tionalized" awards,
In order to set up the Dutch decisions in proper perspective, it should be
recalled that the award had been rendered in the Canton of Vaud, Switzer-
land, by two arbitrators instead of an uneven number of arbitrators as
required by the law of the Canton of Vaud. 17 When the award was submit-
ted to the Cantonal Tribunal for registration, the Tribunal held that since
the Cantonal Rules of Procedure had not been followed, the award could
not qualify as a local award and that registration must be denied. At the
same time, the Tribunal stated that its decision did not preclude the validity
of the award under other legal systems. 18 On appeal the judgment was
affirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.19
These decisions seemed to imply that the award might be a "delocalized"
or an "internationalized" award. This issue of characterization was submit-
ted to the Dutch courts in recognition proceedings brought by the SEEE in
the Netherlands. More precisely the issue was whether the award met the
tests set forth in article I(1) of the New York Convention and could be
regarded as an award "made" in the territory of Switzerland. 20
I.L.M. 151 (1981)). In that case, however, the court held that the sole fact that the award had
been rendered in Geneva did not establish sufficient contact with Switzerland to authorize
Swiss courts to assume jurisdiction and to permit execution against the assets of Libya in
Switzerland. See also J.F. Lalive, Swiss Law and Practie in Relation to Measures of Execution
against the Property ofa Foreign State, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L 153 (1979).
'Hague Court of Appeal November 28, 1978, 9 I.L.M. 152 (1970).
"TAward of July 2, 1956, 24 I.L.R. 761 (1957); Clunet 1959, 1074.
"Trib. Vaud, February 12, 1957, Societ6 Europ6enne d'Etudes et d'Entreprises v. R6pub-
lique Populaire F6d rative de Yougoslavie, Rev. Crit. Dr. Int. Pr. 1958, 359.
"T.F. September 18, 1957, Rev. Crit. Dr. Int. Pr. 1958, 366 at 367.
'Both Switzerland and the Netherland have made the declaration that they would apply the
New York Convention only to awards "made in the territory" at other contracting states.
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According to the Hague Court of Appeal, the "making" of an award
should not refer only to the geographical location of the seat of arbitration;
this concept should include also a reference to the municipal law of the
state in which the award was rendered. In view of the fact that the Swiss
courts had held that the award did not satisfy the requirements of Vaud
law, the court of appeal felt that the award was not a "Swiss" award and
was, therefore, not entitled to recognition in the Netherlands.
21
On appeal, the Hoge Raad (the Dutch Highest Court) quashed the Hague
court's decision on the ground, inter alia, that neither the provisions of arti-
cle I(1) of the convention, nor the "Travaux Pr~paratoires" justified the
construction adopted by the lower court.
22
Upon remand from the Hoge Raad, the Hague Court of Appeal persisted
in refusing to recognize the award, but this time on another ground, namely
that the award was contrary to Dutch public policy.
23
A new appeal was taken to the Hoge Raad. The Hoge Raad entertained
the appeal insofar as it concerned the public policy argument, but held that
in final analysis, recognition of the award should be denied on the basis of
article V(l)(a) of the convention, i.e., because as a result of the decisions of
the Swiss Courts, the award was no longer capable of execution in Switzer-
land, and consequently of recognition in the Netherlands.
24
The exact significance of the Hoge Raad decisions is somewhat uncertain.
The 1973 decision seems to support the view that an "international" award
may qualify for recognition under the convention so long as it is "made" in
the territory of a contracting state. However, the 1975 decision reverts to
considerations which, in addition to the place of making of the award,
would seem to "re-nationalize" the award by bringing it within the legal
system of the country in which the award is "made."
'25
Whatever their exact meaning, the Dutch decisions make it apparent that
the status of "non-national" awards is not as settled as could be desired. In
this connection, a Belgian decision also deserves mention.
In Socobel v. Greek State ,26 an award had been confirmed in proceedings
before the P.C.I.J. The Belgian company in whose favor the award had
been rendered sought to garnish debts owing to the Greek government,
2Hague September 8, 1972 (as translated into French), Revue de 'Arbitrage 1974, 313.
"Hoge Raad October 26, 1973, as translated by Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration,
New York Convention (1978) no. V, 18, at 2.
"Hague October 25, 1974 (as translated into French), Revue de I'Arbitrage 1974, 322.
24Hoge Raad November 7, 1975 as translated by Gaja, op. cit. note 22supra (1978) no. V, 35,
at 2-3.
"Parallel with the Dutch proceedings, the SEEE has sought recognition and enforcement of
the award in France. The French proceedings, which began in the 1960s, are still pending.
Unlike the Dutch decisions, the French judgments rendered so far do not deal with the appli-
cability of the New York Convention. While they deny recognition to the 1956 award, this
solution is based on other considerations. For a review of these cases, see DELAUME, TRANS-
NATIONAL CONTRACTS (1980 updating), 13.16.
2
"Trib. Civ. Brussels April 30, 1951, 18 I.L.R. 3 (1951), JOURNAL DES TRJBUNAUX May 20,
1951, 298.
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which pleaded immunity. The plea of immunity failed, but the garnish-
ment was vacated on the ground that neither the award nor the P.C.I.J.'s
judgment had been granted recognition in Belgium. This decision implies
that recognition of an international award would depend upon the rules
obtaining at the recognizing forum.
In view of the inconsistent results reached at the time of recognition of
"international" awards, the question arises whether this legal uncertainty
should act as a deterrent to internationalizing techniques.
If legal issues were the sole factor of decision, the prudent lawyer would
probably answer the question in the affirmative.
However, arbitration with governments is not motivated solely by legal
considerations. More often than not, the parties do rely on the good faith
and credit of the government involved and its willingness to comply with
the terms of an award. 27 Although compliance may take some time and
result in negotiated settlements, 28 arbitration is usually an effective method
of adjudication. If it is expected that measures of coercion be necessary, the
problem should be solved by specific provisions in the form of waivers of
immunity from execution. This, however, is a factor which has no bearing
upon the domestic or international character of the arbitral process, since it
is common to both types of arbitration, 29 as well as to ICSID arbitration,
albeit in a somewhat different context.
II. ICSID Arbitration
A. A Self- Contained System
As already mentioned, the ICSID Convention provides a self-contained
arbitration machinery. Under the convention, consent to ICSID arbitra-
tion, once it is given, is irrevocable and if a party fails to participate in the
proceedings, the other party finds in the convention and the Arbitration
Rules supplementing it effective means for the proceedings to take place
and result in an arbitral award.
ICSID arbitration functions in total independance from domestic
courts.30 If there is need to appoint arbitrators, the convention confers
upon the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID the power to
"See, e.g., von Mehren and Kourides, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 538-9.
"I1d op. at 545 in regard to the BP, Topco and LIAMCO awards.
291t is to be noted that waivers of immunity from execution are much less frequent than
waivers of immunity from suit for the simple reason, among others, that states are unwilling to
subscribe to provisions which cast a doubt on their willingness to comply with adverse deci-
sions. See DELAUME, op. cit. note 25 supra, 12.05.
3 Note, however, that a contracting state may require exhaustion of local remedies as a con-
dition of its consent to ICSID arbitration (article 26 of the convention). So far, this exception
has had little practical significance. None of the ICSID clauses known to the secretariat
requires exhaustion of local remedies. The same is true in regard to domestic investment laws
referring to ICSID as a means of settlement of investment disputes and of the overwhelming
majority of bilateral investment treaties in point.
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make the necessary appointment. 3' Once the tribunal has been constituted,
the tribunal finds in the provisions of the convention and of the Arbitration
Rules adopted by ICSID effective means to conduct the proceedings and to
bring them to their ultimate conclusion.
Furthermore, article 53(1) of the convention provides that the parties are
bound by the award and that the award is not subject to any appeal or to
any other remedy, except those provided in the convention. 32 In other
words, ICSID awards are truly international awards subject only to the
rules set forth in the convention and are not open to attack on any ground
in the courts of contracting states.
As soon as the parties are notified of the terms of an ICSID award, they
must abide by and comply with it. This principle, which is clearly formu-
lated in article 53 of the convention, is consistent with the consensual char-
acter of ICSID arbitration and the rule that the parties must comply with
their undertakings in good faith.
In order, however, to anticipate the fact that a party may not immediately
comply with an award, the convention provides an original and effective
procedure for the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards. This pro-
cedure, which now deserves consideration, eliminates the pitfalls which
may still exist in the path of non-ICSID international awards.
B. Recognition and Enforcement of ICSID Awards
Article 54(1) of the convention provides that each contracting state shall
recognize an ICSID award and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by the award as if it were a final judgment of a court in the recognizing
state.
In addition, article 54(2) of the convention makes the procedure for rec-
ognition and enforcement as simple as possible. Any party to an ICSID
award may obtain recognition and enforcement of the award by furnishing
to the competent court or authority designated in avance by each con-
tracting state a copy of the award certified by the secretary-general of
ICSID.
The originality and the merits of the procedure set forth in the ICSID
Convention are apparent. Under the convention, there is no exception, not
even on the ground of public policy, to the binding character of ICSID
awards and to their recognition and enforcement in contracting states. This
procedure, therefore, constitutes major progress over existing rules concern-
ing the recognition and enforcement of foreign or international awards.
Furthermore, the lack of any distinction, for purposes of recognition and
enforcement, between awards rendered against an investor or a contracting
3
'This has been the case in eight (out of fifteen) disputes submitted to ICSID arbitration.
32Only two remedies are provided for in the convention, namely: revision of the award on
the ground of newly discovered facts (article 5 1) and annulment because of serious procedural
errors (article 52).
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state maintains the careful balance between the respective interests of both
states and investors, which is one of the major features of the convention.
Article 54 of the convention prevents the contracting state party to the
dispute from raising at the time of recognition and enforcement of an
ICSID award the defense of immunity from suit. In the system of the con-
vention, recognition and enforcement are considered as constituting the
ultimate phase of the arbitration process and the contracting state party to
the dispute is deemed to have waived any defense, including immunity
from suit, which would interfere with the ICSID machinery and would be
inconsistent with the consent given by that state to ICSID arbitration. In
other words, the convention rules regarding recognition and enforcement
are independent from other rules concerning measures of execution, and
possible immunity issues, following recognition and enforcement. Benve-
nuti & Bon/ant v. The Government of the People's Republic of Congo,33 illus-
trates this remark. In that case, an ICSID award had been granted
recognition by the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, but
the president had qualified the order granting recognition by stating that if
the award creditors wanted to execute the award against Congolese assets in
France, they would have first to seek his authorization. On appeal, the
court of appeal reversed that part of the lower court's order regarding exe-
cution. It held that article 54(2) was intended to facilitate the recognition
and enforcement of ICSID awards in contracting states and that it limited
the functions of the recognizing forum to ascertaining the authenticity of
the award as certified by the secretary-general of ICSID. The court stated
that:
[T]he order granting recognition and enforcement to an arbitral award does not
constitute a measure of execution but is only a decision preceding possible meas-
ures of execution.3
4
and that, therefore, in addressing the issue of immunity from execution at
the time of recognition, the president of the tribunal had exceeded his
authority.
First, and to date the only, decision in point, the judgment of the Court of
Appeal of Paris deserves approval. By segregating issues of recognition and
enforcement from subsequent measures of execution it is in complete
accord with the provisions of the convention. This is the time to recall that
if article 54 provides for an effective procedure regarding the recognition of
ICSID, article 55 acknowledges also that this procedure shall in no way "be
construed as derogating from the law in force in any contracting state relat-
ing to immunity of that state or of any foreign state from execution." In
other words, as soon as an ICSID award is recognized, it becomes a valid
title on the basis of which measures of execution can be taken, e.g. in the
form of attachment, provided, however, that, if such measures are directed
33Paris June 26, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981); Clunet 1981, 843.
1420 I.L.M. at 881.
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against state property, execution is possible under the law of the state in
which execution is sought.
Because the ICSID Convention surrenders measures of execution to
domestic rules of immunity, it is possible that, as in the case of other arbi-
tral awards, those rendered under the convention be subjected to a different
treatment in contracting states.
Although this possibility cannot be ignored, there is nevertheless a signif-
icant difference between the rights of an award-creditor under the conven-
tion and those of a party to a non-ICSID award. In this connection, it must
be noted that the fact that in adhering to the convention, contracting states
do not surrender their own right to immunity from execution in no way
relieves them of their obligations under the convention.
In particular, it is clear that if a contracting state party to a dispute
invoked immunity from execution, either in its own courts or in the courts
of another contracting state, in order to frustrate enforcement of an ICSID
award, that state would violate its obligation to comply with the award. In
that case, the state involved would be exposed to various sanctions, which
are expressly provided for in the convention and deserve attention.
In the first place, failure to comply would restore the right of the con-
tracting state whose national is the award-creditor to give diplomatic pro-
tection to its national and to bring an international claim on its behalf.
Under article 27(1) of the convention, diplomatic protection is suspended
during the period beginning with the date of consent to ICSID arbitration
and ending with compliance with the terms of an ICSID award. It may also
terminate with the dismissal of the investor's claim by the arbitral tribunal.
However, article 27(1) provides expressly that diplomatic protection may be
exercised again if the contracting state party to the dispute fails "to abide by
and comply with the award rendered in such dispute."
In the second place, should the issue of non-compliance raise a question
of interpretation or application of the ICSID Convention, the contracting
state whose national is involved would have the right to submit the question
for adjudication to the International Court of Justice, unless both con-
tracting states agreed on another method (e.g. by arbitration) of
settlement. 35
In other words, although the convention does not purport to change
existing rules of immunity from execution, it nevertheless imparts a new
spirit to the rules by which the game may be played.
III. Multipartite Arbitration
The present discussion would not be complete without mentioning an
issue, which is likely to gain importance in the years ahead, namely the
problem of multipartite arbitration.
"Article 64 of the convention.
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In order to illustrate the nature of the problem, let us take an example
which is based on real facts, though considerably simplified for the clarity
of the expose.
Suppose that company A, a corporation controlled by several multina-
tional companies, invests in a mining venture in country B, under an invest-
ment agreement providing for ICSID arbitration. Suppose also that the
venture is financed in part by a loan made to country B by the World Bank
which, consistent with its traditional practice, provides for ad hoc interna-
tional arbitration,36 and that the loan is secured by various undertakings
from the private sponsors of the project, including take or pay contracts
between them and company A providing for ICC arbitration. Suppose fur-
ther that each set of documents contains a force majeure clause relieving
the obligor from its obligations in the event of political interference with the
project by country B and that the-issue of interference is submitted for deci-
sion to each and all of the arbitral tribunals.
In a case such as this, it is conceivable that the various tribunals reach
different conclusions by means of different routes and at different speeds.
Both during the proceedings and at the time of enforcement of the respec-
tive awards, these parallel procedures may be totally uncoordinated and
lead to inconsistent findings.
At the present time, there is no real remedy to the problem. The problem
has been the object of much attention by specialized institutions, such as the
ECE and the ICC, and is under active consideration by the ICSID Secreta-
riat. It is too early to tell which practical recommendations may emerge
from these various studies, but it is clear that the problem is here to stay
and that it cannot be ignored.
Conclusion
At the end of this brief inquiry into some of the features of arbitration
with governments, only one thing is clear and it is that if international arbi-
tration is to be preferred, the preference should be for ICSID arbitration.
Beyond this, the choice between domestic and international arbitration
remains very much a question of circumstances and of confidence in the
arbitral process as an effective means of settling disputes with governments.
If the parties operate in a climate of mutual trust, international arbitration
may be an acceptable solution. When this is not the case, domestic arbitra-
tion is likely to offer definite advantages, not only in regard to matters of
procedure but, most important, in regard to the recognition and enforce-
ment of the award.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that discussions are proceeding
among the United States, Iran and the Netherlands to determine to what
3 General Conditions, § 10.04. DELAUME, Op. cit. note 25 supra, 14.01.
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extent the awards rendered by the Tribunal set up under the Claims Settle-
ment Agreement might qualify for purposes of recognition as valid awards
under Dutch law. Although the issue has not yet been settled, the fact that
it is under consideration is nevertheless highly significant. 37
"See, e.g., Feldman, Implementation of the Iranian Claims Settlement Agreement-Status,
Issues and Lessons. View from Government Perspective, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD,
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, 75 (1981), at 97-98; Audit, Les "Accords" d'Alger du 19janvier
1981 Tendant au Rkglement des Di§rends entre les Etats- Unis et lIran, CLUNET 1981, 713 at
767-68 and 775.
